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1The Resource-Based Tangle:
Towards a Sustainable Explanation of
Competitive Advantage
Abstract
The arguably dominant contemporary approach to the analysis of
sustained competitive advantage is the resource-based view. Taking
Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993) as representative summary statements
of the view, we argue that much resource-based research rests on
partial, implicit and problematic assumptions, and that this has led to
conclusions that are much less general than the proponents of the view
believe.  As an example, the widely cited ”value-rareness-inimitability”
or “heterogeneity-immobility-ex post and ex ante limits to competition”
lists do not stand up to scrutiny.  In general, the view suffers from a
confusion of what are necessary conditions for the expression of
sustained competitive advantage and what are additional conditions
which only serve to give the expression of sustained competitive
advantage a specific form. We argue that there are only two necessary
conditions for the expression of sustained competitive advantage,
namely uncertainty and immobility, and that all other conditions are
additional.
2Introduction
The arguably key strategy (content) issue has conventionally been seen as the
creation and sustainability of firm-level competitive advantage. A large
theoretical and a growing empirical literature exist on the subject.  The perhaps
dominant contemporary approach to the analysis of sustained competitive
advantage (henceforth,”SCA”) is the resource-based view (henceforth, “the
RBV”), initiated in strategy content research in the mid-1980s by Wernerfelt
(1984), Rumelt (1984) and Barney (1986), and continued by these and other
writers (e.g., Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Barney 1991, 1997; Black and Boal 1994;
Conner 1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Grant 1991; Kay 1993; Peteraf 1993; Reed
and DeFilippi 1990; Wernerfelt 1995; Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1986; Williams
1992). It is hard to underestimate the strength of the voice of the RBV in the
present conversation in strategy research.  The critique that we shall present in
this paper is thus not an unfairly harsh critique of a budding research program,
but rather an overhaul of some of the basic premises of a perspective that has
been well established in the strategy field for about 15 years, has been dominant
for almost as long, and has gone surprisingly unchallenged.
Of course, some critical voices have been raised (e.g., Ghemawat 1991;
Porter 1994; Pedersen 1999).  For example, critics have pointed to the RBV’s
neglect of the firm’s environment and its over-emphasis on uniqueness (of
resources and strategies), to the chicken-and-egg nature of the problem of
ascertaining the temporal priority of firm versus industry determinants of
competitive advantage (e.g., Porter 1994), and, relatedly, to the necessarily dual
nature of an industry and a firm view of competitive advantage (Ghemawat 1991;
Pedersen 1999).   While we sympathize with these critiques, our critical points are
different.
First, we shall argue that much RBV research rests on partial and/or implicit
assumptions and that this has led to a number of problematic conclusions.  We
provide examples of this.
3 Second, we argue that the RBV is characterized by a confusion of necessary
and additional conditions in the analysis of SCA. Specifically, the RBV has not
precisely disentangled those fundamental conditions that are always logically
necessary for the expression of SCA from those additional conditions that are not
strictly necessary but which may add to the analysis by giving the expression of
SCA a specific form. An example that may help illustrate this important
distinction is the formation of prices in a market.  Here, certain conditions are
logically necessary, such as the assumption of the existence of a demand side of
the market that values the relevant goods.  But whether the particular market is
monopolistic, oligopolistic or competitive is, strictly speaking, not necessary
conditions for the existence and abstract understanding of pricing.  Assumptions
about market structure are what we here call additional conditions, which give
the expression of market price a specific form.
 Third, a point that is closely related to the two previous ones, but is more
implicit in the discussion, is that although the RBV has drawn strongly on
economics, the adoption of economic principles has been rather incomplete.  In
fact, in our view this incompleteness may be an important source of such features
of the RBV as implicit theorizing (i.e., implicitly working with certain crucial
assumptions) and the inability to distinguish between necessary and additional
conditions.  Fundamentally, the use of economics in the RBV has not gone
significantly beyond very basic price theory (Foss 2000).1  Needless to say, there is
much more to economics than this, and a huge potential with respect to further
refining and extending RBV reasoning awaits exploitation.
In order to support these claims, we first summarize the RBV, drawing on
what may well be the two most quoted and authoritative summary statements of
the RBV, namely Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993) (”The Resource-Based View of
Sustained Competitive Advantage”).  We then present a number of key RBV ideas
that turn out to be quite problematic when analyzed through the lens of economic
                                                 
1  Notable exceptions are  Wernerfelt (1984, 1995) and Lippman and Rumelt (1982).
4reasoning (”Some Fundamental Problems in the Resource-Based View”).  For example,
many RBV ideas are put forward as general propositions.  However, it is often
easy to construct counter-examples to these (and we shall provide some).  In our
view, this is because the distinction between what are necessary and additional
conditions for the expression of SCA is confused in the RBV, and, because a
number of conditions are implicitly stated.
As an example of the latter, the RBV argues that resources acquired on
informationally efficient factor markets cannot be sources of SCA (Barney 1986).
However, nothing is said in the RBV about the institutional basis of trading
processes in such markets and nothing is said about the characteristics of those
who bargain on factor markets.  However, RBV conclusions strongly depend on
additional and highly contingent assumptions about trading processes.  This is an
example of both incomplete use of economics and ignorance of the necessary
conditions for the existence of SCA. As an example of the confusion between
necessary and additional conditions for the expression of SCA, consider the RBV
claim that uniqueness of strategies is a necessary condition for the existence of
SCA (e.g., Barney 1991; Aharoni 1993).  However, this may only be so if strategies
are substitutes; if they are complementary, in the sense that implementing the
same strategies raise profits (likely within bounds) for the relevant firms, the
claim is, of course, false. Uniqueness is only required for SCA if the additional
assumption is made that there are no strategic complements (Bulow et al. 1985).
So, unless the specific additional condition is taken on board, that strategic
complements are absent, uniqueness of strategies is not a necessary condition for
the existence of SCA. Furthermore, as we shall point out, uniqueness of strategies
is actually not necessarily a condition for the expression of SCA, even in the
absence of strategic complements.
The bottom-line of all this is that competitive outcomes are highly
dependent on additional conditions regarding competitive activity, bargaining,
and much else ¾ conditions that are seldom or never stated explicitly in the RBV.
5As a result, RBV frameworks have not yet identified the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of (sustained) competitive advantage. In fact, we shall
argue that there are only two such conditions, namely uncertainty and immobility
(”The Determinants of Competitive Advantage”).  These are truly necessary in the
sense that we cannot rationalize SCA without these two concepts.  On the other
hand, they are also the only necessary conditions (i.e., they are sufficient), in the
sense that regardless of the specific additional conditions that we impute to the
context of competitive advantage ¾ such as the characteristics of competition
(e.g., Bertrand or Cournot), the specification of trading processes on factor
markets, the protocol of the game, etc. ¾ combinations of uncertainty and
immobility may always be chosen so that equilibria with firms that have
differential competitive advantages (i.e., realize differential profits) can be
supported.  However, a comprehensive strategic framework should also identify
as many and as precisely as possibly the set of additional conditions which may,
in real world strategic settings, define the context of competitive advantage.
The Resource-based View of Sustained
Competitive Advantage
The different components of the RBV view of SCA have been laid down in a
number of important papers published since the mid-1980s (notably Wernerfelt
1984; Barney 1986, 1991; Rumelt 1987; Dierickx and Cool 1989). Rather than
providing a comprehensive literature review of all these contributions, we focus
on two much cited papers that elegantly and somewhat differently pull together
in simple frameworks the diverse theoretical components that enter into the RBV
analysis of SCA.   These two papers are Jay Barney’s 1991 paper, “Firm Resources
and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” and Margaret Peteraf’s 1993 paper, “The
Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage.” We regard these two papers as
6authoritative summaries of the RBV on SCA, and shall refer to them throughout
this paper rather than to other RBV papers.2
Barney’s 1991 Analysis
The RBV is conventionally distinguished from other approaches to strategy
by taking the individual resource as the unit of analysis when it comes to
understanding the sources of SCA.  Moreover, the RBV is also often characterized
as a distinctive approach by pointing to its beginning from the factor market side
rather than from the product market side, again somewhat in contrast to other
approaches to strategy.  Thus, attention is focused on various characteristics of
resources, including the price at which their services are acquired, in order to
clarify whether these resources may be sources of SCA.
However, Barney (1991) begins by formulating the analysis of SCA in terms
of the strategies that firms implement in product markets. According to Barney,
one necessary condition for SCA to obtain is uniqueness of product market
strategies. In other words, only strategies that are not implemented by competitor
firms can secure a SCA. This would seem to make SCA a product market concept
(perhaps somewhat in contrast to the usual identification of the RBV with an
emphasis on factor markets). However, Barney is quick to point out that although
uniqueness of product market strategies is crucial for the expression of SCA, the
key to understanding what make strategies valuable and sustain their uniqueness
lies at a lower level of analysis, namely at the level of resources that a firm needs
to access and control in order to implement its strategies.
Barney then goes on to discuss the necessary conditions that resources must
conform to in order to give rise to valuable and unique strategies, that is, to give
rise to SCA. Referring to the SWOT framework, Barney defines resources as being
                                                 
2 For example, we don’t make reference to the paper that is conventionally taken to be the
founding contribution of the RBV, namely Wernerfelt (1984).  Further reasons for this is that
Wernerfelt’s paper is perhaps more of a contribution to the diversification literature than to the
literature on competitive advantage, is often cited but surprisingly little used, and does not seem
to be vulnerable to the critiques of the RBV that we launch.
7valuable when they help seizing an opportunity in the firm’s environment or
when they help neutralizing some threat in that environment, or at least shielding
the firm against the threat.  By resources being rare, Barney seems to have a
simple counting sense (as distinct from an economic sense) in mind.  Thus, if a
million firms control a certain resource, it is not likely to be rare (even if a billion
firms badly need the relevant resource).  Firms that control valuable and rare
resources possess a competitive advantage and will be able to implement
superior strategies.
While necessary, these two criteria are not sufficient, since they do not
guarantee that competitive advantage can be enjoyed on a sustained basis.  This
shifts the attention to two additional necessary criteria that resources must
conform to in order to give rise to a SCA, namely non-imitability and non-
substitutability.  The non-imitability (or more correctly: “costly-to-imitate”)
condition directs attention to whether (or more correctly: at which cost)
competitor firms can acquire or accumulate resources with attributes and levels
of attributes similar to some desired resource (Barzel 1997) which produces a
competitive advantage.  The non-substitutability (or more correctly: “costly-to-
substitute”)  condition directs attention to whether (or more correctly: at which
cost) competitor firms can access resources that will allow them to implement the
same strategies as some successful firm.  This is different from the non-imitability
condition because it is not here required that the underlying resources that
substituting firms access are the same as those controlled by the successful firm in
terms of their composition and level of attributes.
These two criteria directs attention to the barriers that may block imitation
and substitution and much research in the RBV has centered on identifying and
classifying such barriers (e.g., Rumelt 1987; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Reed and
DeFilippi 1990; Grant 1991).  It is also these two criteria that allows Barney to
define the existence of SCA in terms of situations in which all attempts by
                                                                                                                                        
8competitor firms at imitating or substituting a successful firm have ceased.  Thus,
SCA is seen as a property of some essentially unspecified Nash-equilibrium.3   
Barney’s framework is summarized in Figure 1a.4
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure a and 1b here XXXXXXXX
Peteraf’s 1993 Analysis
Peteraf’s analysis of the conditions for SCA, which is summarized in Figure
1b, is somewhat different from Barney’s by more explicitly drawing on basic
price-theory, specifically the economic analysis of various types of rent.
Moreover, it directly takes individual resources as the relevant level of analysis,
rather than strategies.
According to Peteraf, resources yield a SCA to the firm that controls them
when they meet four necessary conditions.  The first one is that the resource
should be heterogeneous, where heterogeneity is essentially undefined but may be
taken to refer to differences in the amount and level of various attributes of the
resource relative to other resources.  The implication is that resources that are
heterogeneous in this sense will lead to different outcomes when they are used in
similar productive occupations (e.g., similar manufacturing processes).  In
particular, there will be efficiency differences across resources.  These efficiency
differences translate into differences in rents, both in the Ricardian sense, where
rents arise as a result of efficiency differences inside the same resource category
(e.g., land), and in the more standard opportunity cost sense, where rent is the
difference between the value of the resource in the best and the next-best uses.
Peteraf adds to this that for the firm to actually be able to reap the economic
                                                 
3 An idea earlier formalized by Lippman and Rumelt (1982), and going back at least to Demsetz
(1973).
4 It should be mentioned that Barney (1997) has later added the efficient organization of resources
as an independent necessary condition for the expression of SCA.
9fruits of superior efficiencies, the relevant resources should be characterized by
imperfect mobility ¾ which means that the resource should be relatively specific to
the firm.  The underlying story is that bargaining advantage and mobility is
directly related.  For example, (the owner of) a very mobile resource has an
advantage with respect to bargaining over the sharing of the surplus (rent) that
the resource’s activity in the firm produces, and while the resource may give rise
to substantial surplus, the firm (i.e., the other input owners) will not be able to
share very much of this surplus with (the owner of) the resource.
In addition to the criteria of heterogeneity and imperfect mobility, Peteraf
focuses on competitive forces that relate to acquisition of resources.  Thus,
following Barney (1986), she argues that resources must be acquired at a price
below their discounted net present value in order to yield rents/give rise to SCA
¾ this is the necessary condition of ex ante limits to competition.  If this condition is
not met, future rents will be fully absorbed in the price paid for the resource.
Finally, Peteraf focuses on ex post limits to competition as a final necessary
condition for the expression of SCA. This is a more guarded version of Barney’s
(1991) condition of non-imitability, and directs attention to the reasons why
would-be competitors may find it costly to imitate attractive resources.
Some Fundamental Problems in
the Resource-based View
The above analyses have been widely cited and used,5 and we shall take them as
broadly representative of much RBV work on the sources of SCA.  In the
following paragraphs, we identify problems and ambiguities that are associated
with these analyses, and argue that these problems and ambiguities stem from
                                                 
5  As, for example, participants in Academy of Management and Strategic Management Society
meetings will know.
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the fact that the analyses often stop short of identifying fundamental causes of
competitive advantage, and that necessary assumptions are usually not stated or
even misidentified.
Valuable and Rare Resources
The basic RBV aim is to consider the reach of heterogeneous (rather than
homogeneous) resources as causes of heterogeneous outcomes (i.e., differential
performance).6  While this is a worthwhile aim, there are reasons to be less
comfortable with some specific ideas concerning this link between heterogeneous
resources and outcomes.
As we saw above, Barney (1991) requires that only resources that are rare,
valuable, non-imitable, and non-substitutable can be sources of SCA. From an
economic point of view, this is a partly pleonastic scheme, since resources cannot
be valuable if they are not rare; thus, a rare resource is a valuable resource (Lewin
and Phelan 1999; Pedersen 1998).  Thus, all the scheme appears to be saying is
that a resource that is valuable on a sustained basis is a source of SCA, which, of
course, is a tautology, at least if we think of competitive advantage in terms of
value creation.7
 One may argue that the charge that Barney (and those who repeat his
scheme) confuses value and rareness turns on value being defined in terms of
market price. An alternative interpretation may be to suggest that Barney
exclusively uses ”value” in reference to the subjective valuation of infra-marginal
consumers/users. In this case, however, SCA is essentially assumed by limiting
                                                 
6 We note in passing that heterogeneity of resources is seldom or never defined.  One possible
understanding of heterogeneous resources is that these are inputs with different levels of valued
attributes.
7 Furthermore, sustainability of competitive advantage is a matter of whether the uniqueness of
the relevant resources can be sustained in equilibrium.  This depends on the degree of imitability
and substitutability of the resources.  Now, it is not clear that the condition of substitutability is
necessary.  From an economic point of view, if resources are functionally substitutable (e.g., can
underlie the same strategy), they should be treated as identical  (Lewin and Phelan 1999). In other
words, substitutability is not an independent necessary condition; it collapses into the hard-to-
imitate condition.
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the supply of those resources that produce goods at a cost below the customer’s
willingness to pay.  So, the scheme now appears to be saying that the lucky few
holding a resource whose products are valued over the competitive price on a
sustained basis hold a source of SCA. This re-interpretation does not seem to help
much in escaping tautological reasoning.
The important part of the RBV has to do with the distinction between
homogeneous and heterogeneous resources rather than with the specific
postulated link between heterogeneous resources and heterogeneous outcomes.
This is because heterogeneous resources are more likely to be immobile than
homogenous resources (e.g., they may be more specific), as we shall later explain.
However, even the emphasis placed on heterogeneity may sometimes be
misplaced, for example, as when it is claimed that possessing heterogeneous
resources in an industry is a necessary condition for success (Barney 1991: 104).
As an example, consider an industry where incumbents control
homogeneous endowments (resources), but where competition is Cournot and
high entry barriers exist for whatever reason (it doesn’t matter whether these are
strategic or ”natural”).  Firms will, of course, earn returns above the competitive
level, although the resources they control are identical.8  As a related example,
consider an industry with n identical units of capacity (each unit being controlled
by one firm) and given entry barriers.  Let y (0< y <n) capacity units “die” (e.g.,
because of natural disasters that physically wipe them out) and trace the resulting
equilibrium under Cournot competition.  Then, the surviving capacity units/
firms will demonstrate better performance, even though heterogeneity has not
                                                                                                                                        
8 A RBV critic may of course counter that we are actually talking about heterogeneous resources,
because incumbents control resources that are different from those controlled by firms outside
the industry.  However, when RBV writers are discussing heterogeneity, they refer to intra-
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increased.
                                                                                                                                        
industry heterogeneity (e.g., Peteraf 1993).
These toy examples suggest, first, the rather elementary point that industry
entry barriers must matter for performance, somewhat contrary to the general tenor
of the RBV.  Second, they suggest the, likewise elementary, point that the form of
competition matters for competitive outcomes.  While resource-based writers are
generally keenly and critically aware of the role of entry-barriers in accounting for
performance differences, they have paid little or no attention to the form that inter-
industry rivalry may take.  For example, Peteraf (1993) illustrates her reasoning
with reference to only a competitive price-taking context that only differs from the
standard competitive equilibrium model by allowing for some asymmetric
information on the level of production technology.   Surely, it is completely
acceptable to assume the harshest possible competitive conditions, such as Bertrand
competition.   This may be the case because one wishes to fully concentrate on the
impact of heterogeneous endowments on performance differences.  But this should
be stated and justified, exactly for the reason that the performance distribution in an
industry is not just a function of firm-specific resources and industry barriers, but
also of the form that competition takes in that industry. Unfortunately, RBV
analyses fail to provide explicit specification of the form of competition despite the
fact that this additional condition gives distinct shape to the expression of SCA.
A possible import of the reasoning so far is that the important distinction in
the analysis of SCA is not really the one between homogeneity and heterogeneity
per se, but rather the one between mobility and immobility of factors/ resources
(Baumol et al. 1982).  Thus, an industry of firms that are homogeneous in terms of
the resources they control may nevertheless be characterized by firms with above-
normal returns if it is costly for potential entrants to compete in that industry.  The
above normal returns may be composed of both rents and profits, but the essence is
that for some reason it is costly for potential entrants to transfer resources to the
13
industry and set up production.
The Uniqueness Argument
The emphasis in the RBV on heterogeneous resources as necessary conditions
for competitive success is often encountered in a strong(er) version which
emphasizes uniqueness of strategies. As we have seen this is the case of Barney
(1991) (if not of Peteraf 1993).  To quote one author: ”[c]ompetitive advantage can
be achieved if the firm is able to be different. Success is based on using a unique
strategy.  The ability to protect the uniqueness against imitators ensures continued
success” (Aharoni 1993: 31).  This emphasis on uniqueness goes back to the
founding fathers of the strategy field, such as Selznick (1957) and Andrews (1971).
However, it may be at least partly misguided, notably when strategies are
complementary.
An important distinction in recent industrial organization economics concerns
whether firm strategies are substitutes or complements (Bulow et al. 1985; Tirole,
1988). For example, consider firm A and firm B, both placed in the same industry.
If firm A’s return from implementing a strategy is increasing in firm B’s return from
implementation of its strategy and vice versa, then the strategies of the two firms are
complementary.  A special case of this obtains when A and B implement the same
strategy.  This may be the case in network industries (i.e., industries characterized
by network externalities), in which case incumbents, or a subset of the incumbents,
may benefit from adopting identical strategies in the sense of achieving returns
higher than outsiders or compared to the incumbent firms that don’t adopt similar
strategies. Or, it may be the case in oligopoly industries in which firms will benefit
from implementing and enforcing the same pricing strategies.  Clearly,
homogenous resources are a distinct advantage in the latter case, since it eases the
enforcement of oligopolistic collusion (Tirole 1988).   The upshot is that because of
its emphasis on unique strategies, the RBV (and much of strategy thinking in
general) implicitly but erroneously assumes that all strategies are substitutes and
neglects complements.  In reality both substituting and complementary strategies
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matter.   However, even if we abstract from strategic complements, further
problems remain with the RBV analysis of SCA.
A Theory of Competitive Advantage, or of Rents, or Both?
So far, we have taken differential competitive advantage to be identical to
differential profits and/or rents.  However, comparing Barney (1991) and Peteraf
(1993) actually makes it unclear whether the RBV is a theory of competitive
advantage in the sense of a theory of unique product-market strategies where the
uniqueness can be sustained in equilibrium (what appears to be Barney’s position),
a theory of the sustainability of rent differentials in equilibrium (what appears to be
Peteraf’s position), or perhaps both?
This may sound as hair-splitting, but there is a subtle difference here: SCA in
the sense of sustaining a unique strategy in equilibrium doesn’t necessarily imply
the earning of rents in that equilibrium, and vice versa.  For example, a firm may
persistently implement a unique strategy based on resources acquired in fully
competitive and informationally efficient factor markets, in which case the firm
may well have a SCA, but actually only realizes the competitive return.  Or, to take
the inverse case, a firm may adopt the same strategy as a large number of
competitors, but may still exploit informational advantages or bargaining
advantages in factor markets or simply be favoured by luck, so that while it doesn’t
have a SCA, it does earn an above-normal return.
Now, the convention appears to be to associate competitive advantage with
above-normal returns rather than with unique product market strategies.
However, it is easy to see why Barney focuses on unique strategies.  Only in this
way can he uphold an emphasis on unique, firm-specific resources ¾ the emphasis
that is conventionally taken to be the hallmark of the RBV.   But as the above
discussion of complementary strategies has suggested and as we shall later argue in
more detail, a group of firms in an industry may very well implement exactly the
same strategies and still earn rents relative to the rest of that industry.   The
emphasis on uniqueness in the RBV is subject to strong qualifications.
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The RBV Factor Market Argument
Barney’s 1986 analysis of “strategic factor markets” (mirrored in Peteraf’s
notion of ex ante limits to competition) has become very influential.  It provides
much of the justification for the notion that one of the features that distinguish the
RBV from other strategy approaches is its emphasis on factor markets.
Nevertheless, the analysis rests on unstated but crucial assumptions (cf. also
Ghemawat 1991).  The main point of Barney (1986) is this: Since factor markets can
empirically be taken to be at least semi-efficient (in the finance sense), that is, all
publicly available information will be reflected in market prices, firms can only
hope to purchase resources at a price lower than the discounted present value if
they hold some informational advantage or are simply favored by luck. Resources
acquired in factor markets that are perfectly informationally efficient cannot yield
rents to firms.
This argument is not necessarily wrong.  Barney presents it as simply an
application of quite standard economics and finance reasoning.  However, in the
specific formulation adopted by Barney (1986) and by most of those resource-based
writers (e.g., Peteraf 1993) who apply his reasoning ¾ namely that if the demand
and the supply side on strategic factor markets hold the same information, the price
of a resource will equal its discounted present value ¾ the argument is either
wrong, or it rests on very specific, but unstated, assumptions.9
It is true that under symmetric information, bargaining will lead to a
maximization of joint surplus, and, hence, be efficient.  No value will be dissipated
because of transaction costs and strategic behavior.  However, this basic proposition
does not imply any claim per se about the division of surplus, and certainly not that
the supply side appropriates all value, as Barney (1986) asserts.  It is perfectly
conceivable that a firm may acquire a resource in an informationally perfect factor
market at a price below its discounted present value for that firm.  It all depends on
what is asserted about, for example, the competition on both sides of the market,
                                                 
9  For example, Ghemawat (1991) interprets Barney (1986) as having a common value auction in
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the institutional set-up in which trading processes take place, and on factors such as
the ”impatience” (i.e., time preference) of the traders (Rubinstein 1982; Sutton 1986).
These factors determine relative bargaining powers and, hence, the distribution of
surplus between the two sides in the trading processes on factor markets.
The ”No Rules for Riches” Argument  
Accepting the argument that SCA can only be based on resources that are
acquired on informationally inefficient factor markets may suggest the seeming
corollary that competitive advantages cannot be enjoyed from publicly available
strategic advice (e.g. Barney 1986; Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1991a; Kay 1993). In
other words, in the presence of (informationally) perfect factor markets, there can
be no “rules for riches.”  Of course, such an argument rests on the empirical claim
that factor markets are at least semi-efficient. The economic logic appears to be that
factor market prices will perfectly adjust, or, even if competitive forces on these
markets don’t push prices of the relevant resources in the right direction, then
product market competition between numerous firms, all implementing the same
piece of strategic advice, will quickly compete away any excess profits.
                                                                                                                                            
mind.
It is easy to see that this argument can be met with objections similar to those
we used to criticize the general point that competitive advantage is not ensured by
resources acquired in perfect strategic factor markets.  Thus, suppose that firms
accept and use advice á la “only enter markets that grow fast” or “only enter
markets where suppliers are in a weak bargaining position”. Is this useless advice?
Only if the advice is associated with post-entry performance distributions that are
strictly dominated by pre-entry performance distributions, or, as a rather extreme
outcome does not affect the shape of the performance distribution, for example,
when these are mean-preserving and risk-adjusted.
 But why should this hold in general?  Every manager in the economy may
know, for example, that the suppliers to a certain industry are particularly weak,
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but there is no reason to suppose that this translates into a general profit
opportunity.   At the limit, it is conceivable that only a single firm, (or even none at
all), may benefit from the advice, because only this firm has the capability, or
sufficiently deep pockets, to exploit the advice.   As Richardson (1960: 57) pointed
out, “[a] general profit opportunity, which is known to everyone, and equally
capable of being exploited by everyone, is in an important sense, a profit
opportunity for no-one in particular.” The import of Richardson’s point is that an
analysis of whether firms may benefit from publicly available information simply
cannot be made in isolation from the specific details of industries, of the relevant
firms, of capital markets (e.g., there may be rationing on these markets) (Richardson
1960).
Moreover, even abstracting from the above arguments, “the no rules for
riches” argument is problematic as a general proposition.   To see this consider
Lippman and Rumelt (1982) (cf. also Mosakowski 1998).  In a stochastic equilibrium
set-up, in which risk-neutral firms can pay a fee to draw from a random
distribution of possible production functions that determine their costs and
performance, Lippman and Rumelt showed that firms will not earn any rent on
average.  Thus, the advice to enter the industry is in this setting risk-adjusted and
mean-preserving.   However, choosing not to enter the industry means that firms
will not earn rents with certainty, whereas the post-entry performance is associated
with a positive probability of earning rents.  As Mosakowski (1998) put it, there are
at least “rules for chances of riches.”
The Neglect of the Environment
The much-cited findings of Rumelt (1991) have been widely interpreted as an
argument that “industry doesn’t matter.”  It is, however, important to understand
what this means and what it doesn’t mean.   Rumelt’s findings do indeed point to
firm heterogeneity playing the major role for the understanding of performance
distributions.  But they do not suggest that the industry ¾ and in particular the
mode of competition in an industry ¾ can be neglected.  As a matter of general
18
modeling practice, it may be wise to begin by assuming the harshest possible kind
of competition ¾ such as Bertrand competition and competitive equilibrium (as in
Peteraf 1993) ¾ since all sorts of behaviors and performances may be rationalized
by assuming less harsh competition.  One might think that assuming, for example,
Bertrand competition would allow one to “black box” the environment, as one
would not seem to have to bother with complicated oligopolistic interdependence.
Such is not the case.  For example, under Bertrand competition, returns come to a
firm through low costs, as it were.  However, profits come to an industry through
cost heterogeneity.   This implies that there is a collective motive to install an
industrial structure that maximizes cost heterogeneity10 ¾ even if this does not
minimize costs.
 Thus, the form of competition matters for performance, but so does the
organization of industry.  For example, Farrell et al. (1998) examine the vertical
organization of complementary activities by analytically separating whether firms
compete in terms of selling an end product (a ”system”) or whether firms compete
in terms of selling individual components (that together make up the system).
Contrary to intuition, even under Bertrand competition, these two ways of
organizing industry are not perfect substitutes (in terms of overall efficiency and
firm performances), provided that firm resources (proxied by production costs)
differ.   This means that the organization of industry (here in terms of systems or
component organization) is a choice variable for firms, and that firms may have an
incentive to organize industry in such a way that cost heterogeneity is maximized
(which may not minimize costs).   Thus, differential resources clearly matter (in
fact, the whole analysis of Farrell et al. 1998 requires taking such a starting point),
but they matter for reasons that are somewhat different from those normally
identified in the RBV.
Summing Up
                                                 
10 Of course, this is associated with all the usual problems of the provision of public and semi-public
goods.
19
The RBV appears to aspire to being a general theory of SCA.  Its propositions
are put forward as general ones.  For example, both Barney and Peteraf assert that
their frameworks identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for SCA.
However, we have identified a number of arguments derived from these
frameworks where, for example, additional assumptions are required to make the
argument right.  In the next section, we shall argue that the difficulties that we have
exemplified by criticizing these specific arguments are manifestations of deeper-
rooted problems with the basic analysis of SCA, as exemplified by Barney (1991)
and Peteraf (1993).   For example, we shall argue that it is possible to have sustained
interfirm differences in a competitive model with only (demand) uncertainty and
fixed costs (Lippman et al. 1991). More generally and provocatively, we suggest that
there are only two necessary conditions of SCA, namely uncertainty and
immobility. On a fundamental analytical level, there is no need to refer to the whole
armory of, for example, the Peteraf (1993) analysis.11  The main lesson that we draw
from our examination of RBV arguments is the need to strengthen RBV’s
explanatory bite by separating the necessary conditions for the existence of SCA
from those additional conditions, which only serve to give the expression of SCA a
specific form. Put differently, uncertainty and immobility should be the only
conditions to enter the analysis of SCA as exogenous elements whereas a host of
additional conditions are candidates for inclusion as endogenous elements. As
pointed out by Hicks (1979: 22), from the point of view of the theory, “an exogenous
element cannot be an effect, it can only be a cause.” It is in this sense that we
distinguish between necessary and additional conditions. Additional conditions
may be both cause and effect whereas necessary conditions can only be a cause.
The Determinants of Competitive Advantage
                                                 
11 This is not to say that the Peteraf (1993) framework is inconsistent with Lippman, McCardle, and
Rumelt (1991).  For example, it may be argued that the notions of ”immobility” and ”heterogeneity”
relate to the fixed cost component of the Lippman et al. framework and that ”ex post” and ”ex ante
limits to competition” relate to the uncertainty component.  However, the Lippmann et al. analysis
goes beyond the RBV analysis because of its concern with demand-side factors which are neglected
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Necessity and Causality
So far, we have pointed to a number of examples where RBV reasoning relies
on unstated assumptions (e.g., the emphasis on uniqueness and the factor market
argument).  As we see it, this is symptomatic of a broader tendency in the RBV of
not applying sufficient analytical precision. Most fundamentally, we discern what
we think is a confusion of necessary conditions and what reduces to additional
conditions that, while useful for focusing and adding realism to the analysis, are
not strictly necessary for the expression of SCA.  The inability to perform this
separation means that the conditions necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of SCA are not precisely identified and what are only additional
conditions may become elevated to the state of necessity.  An example is
”uniqueness” which by some writers (e.g., Aharoni 1993) is taken to be a necessary
condition for SCA, even if this can only be true in the absence of strategic
complements (which is an empirical matter; not a logical one).
 One way to see the importance of the distinction between necessary and
additional conditions is in terms of the causal structure of the explanation of SCA.
Of course, the production of a SCA in a firm is, at any point in time, a result of the
interplay between many interacting causes, both in theory and in reality.  However,
some causes are more fundamental than others, in theory as well as in reality.
Notably, some causes are necessary for the production of the phenomenon (SCA)
while others are not. As pointed out by Hicks (1979), one possible litmus test for
examining whether some cause is more fundamental than another cause is to ask
whether the former can “dissolve” the latter.  In the present context, this means that
a SCA may conceptually be produced by the operation of the former (necessary)
condition, independently of the state of the latter. Conditions that, regardless of
their particular expression, do not alter the possibility of the existence of SCA
cannot be candidates for necessary conditions (Hicks, 1979), and, are referred to as
additional conditions. This is not to deny the explanatory importance of additional
                                                                                                                                            
in the RBV.
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conditions, however. Clearly, we need statements regarding some additional
conditions to tailor the analysis to capture what we think are the important aspects
of any specific phenomenon to be explained.12  To use an example, while we can
assert that some sunk costs are a necessary condition for the existence of strategic
entry barriers, whether these costs will actually deter entry depends on additional
conditions regarding entrants’ and incumbents’ beliefs, the size of the sunk costs,
etc.
As a strategy (content) theory, the RBV makes causal arguments about the
expression of SCA.  Essentially, we have criticized representative statements of the
RBV (namely Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993) for misrepresenting the causal chain
associated with the expression of SCA.  For example, we pointed to instances in
which the RBV relies on additional conditions that are, however, mistaken for
necessary conditions of SCA. Our conclusion is that the chain of causal
determinants of SCA is misidentified in the RBV.  This misidentification is
problematic, not only because the logic of RBV models may be questioned, but also
because it makes the application of the RBV framework to the real world
troublesome.  For example, empirical research in the RBV is likely to be led astray,
since the effect of variables that measure necessary conditions of SCA (i.e., those
that according to logical necessity must be present for SCA to obtain) will influence
any variable that measures additional conditions (i.e., those that are represented in
models in order to capture a specific phenomenon) and vice versa.  For example, a
regression analysis that omits a control for additional conditions will typically show
biased and weaker effects.  Or, a regression analysis may show a significant result
despite the fact that the only independent variables included were some that
captured additional conditions.  However, a replication will inevitably lead to
incomprehensible results if those variables that reflect necessary conditions  ¾
those omitted in the regression ¾ have changed.
Moreover, the inability in the RBV to “get causality right” is the underlying
                                                 
12  In fact, in section II, we criticized the RBV for not being sufficiently specific about such additional
conditions.
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source of many of the confusions that we reported in the section II.  For example, it
is incorrectly asserted that heterogeneity is a necessary conditions for the expression
of SCA (because, as we shall argue, heterogeneity is a derived concept); that
uniqueness of strategies is a necessary condition for SCA (when this entirely
depends on the specification of further additional conditions regarding the
complementarity and substitutability of strategies); that informational inefficiency
has to exist for SCA to obtain (whereas this depends on further additional
conditions in terms of institutions, trading processes and traders on factor markets),
etc.
The conclusion is that it is essential to provide a correct specification of the
causal chain through which SCA is expressed.  We pursue this objective in the rest
of this paper.  A main conclusion emerging from the analysis is that the widely
cited ”value-rareness-inimitability” or “heterogeneity-immobility-ex post and ex
ante limits to competition” lists do not stand up to scrutiny.   We argue that only
two conditions are necessary for the expression of competitive advantage, namely
uncertainty and immobility.13  No further conditions are needed to produce SCA,
and, all other conditions are additional in the sense that they serve to lend a
particular form to the expression of SCA. Alternatively, additional conditions such
as heterogeneity may themselves be expressions of uncertainty and immobility.
Therefore, additional conditions, including heterogeneity, has an intermediate
position in the causal chain that produces SCA. In consequence, RBV should apply
a sharp distinction between necessary and additional conditions for the expression
of SCA, taking uncertainty and immobility as the only acceptable candidates for
exogenous elements of explanation. All other conditions should be modeled as
endogenous14. In order to support the argument that uncertainty and immobility
                                                 
13  We are agnostic on the precise meaning of ”uncertainty.” Thus, it may be taken to refer to both
Knightian uncertainty and to risk.
14 A case in point for the suggested approach is Sutton’s (1991) theory of market structure.
Interestingly, Sutton (1991) begins with immobility and, it may be argued, adds uncertainty (in
terms of strategic response) in order to arrive at the result that the precondition for the existence of
a concentrated market structure in all situations  (even when market size is indefinitely large) is that
both conditions are present.
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are the starting point of this causal chain and thus necessary and sufficient
conditions for the expression of SCA, we rely heavily on the relevant economics
literature.
Heterogeneity and Performance
Here, we shall review a sample of relevant studies from the industrial
organization literature.  These are relevant in the sense that they are all taken up
with examining performance differentials in equilibrium as somehow influenced by
uncertainty, immobility and heterogeneity.  The common consent emerging from
these studies is that the combined effect of uncertainty and immobility can always
produce heterogeneity in the sense of equilibrium differentials in efficiency
(average costs).  Since the reverse is not always true, they establish the basis for our
argument that uncertainty and immobility should be seen as necessary conditions
for the expression of SCA, while persistent heterogeneity in the efficiency
properties of inputs is best viewed as an additional condition for SCA through
which the effect of uncertainty and immobility is expressed.
The upshot of all this is that a careful consideration of the difference between
necessary conditions and what turns out to be additional conditions, through which
the necessary conditions act to produce SCA, help avoid misidentification of causes
and clauses ¾ the confusion of which has plagued previous RBV attempts to
identify the conditions that by necessity underlies SCA.
Before turning to the review of studies, which establish what we find is an
unambiguous causal relation between uncertainty, immobility, heterogeneity and
SCA, we need to consider what is meant by heterogeneity of outcomes. Implicit in
the RBV is two meanings of outcome heterogeneity, namely (1) efficiency
differentials (average costs) in equilibrium, or (2) different realized non-zero profits
(pure profits in excess of the cost of capital).  Since the two do not necessarily go
hand in hand, an explicit distinction is important. Following RBV writers (e.g.
Peteraf 1993), efficiency differentials in equilibrium may refer to persistent
differences between incumbents’ after some level of entry and exit has been
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allowed for (as in Lippman and Rumelt 1982 and Rumelt 1984).  Compared to
differential efficiencies as a criterion of SCA, non-zero profits is a broader criterion
since it also includes the case of differences between identical incumbents and
potential entrants (as in a number of two-stage Cournot-Nash models involving
sunk costs and perhaps sequential entry, see e.g. Sutton, 1991 and Tirole, 1988). As
previously indicated, the present paper adopts non-zero profits as the basic
criterion of SCA. The perhaps most interesting cases, however, are those included
in the intersection between the two criteria of SCA.
In the following, we first consider studies which analyse how efficiency
differentials may emerge, and then consider two models which may be interpreted
as analyses of how the combination of non-zero profits and efficiency differentials
may be obtained.  The main point of this brief review is that combinations of
uncertainty and immobility may produce efficiency differentials and/or non-zero
profits in equilibrium, whether or not resources are heterogeneous.15
Models of Efficiency Differentials
The primary thrust of this rather brief review of models of efficiency
differentials is to establish that heterogeneity is best viewed as an additional
condition of SCA whereas immobility and uncertainty are necessary conditions.
Lippman et al. (1991) consider a two-stage model where firms are price takers
in a competitive environment. In stage one, firms enter the industry by installing
capacity and paying a fixed cost to do so.  In stage two, demand is announced.
Efficiency increases in fixed costs but because of demand uncertainty, there may be
room also for the less efficient producers. Since the model establishes heterogeneity
as an expression of demand uncertainty and immobility, it is clear that the
necessary conditions for SCA in this model are uncertainty and immobility. By
contrast, heterogeneity enters as an additional condition in the causal chain that
                                                 
15 Let us further note that we follow Lippman and Rumelt (1982), Lippman et al. (1991) and Tirole
(1988) in expanding the common definition of immobility as functional uniqueness to encompass
the much wider number of cases where investment in capacity requires an uncertain non-
recoverable fee, that is, sunk cost commitments.  Consequently, we acknowledge Lippman and
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produces SCA.
A study by Mills and Smith’s (1996) provides an important extension of
Lippman et al. (1991) by considering a continuous set of technologies. The choices of
technology, outputs and prices emerge through a two-stage game: (1) the firms
simultaneously choose technologies, and (2) the firms play Cournot-Nash, choosing
outputs given the cost functions previously chosen in stage 1. As in Lippman et al.
(1991), these embody a trade-off between fixed and variable inputs, and, here
again, we see how heterogeneity is an expression of the (necessary) conditions,
uncertainty and immobility.
The reviewed studies suggest the following conclusion. Within the very wide
bounds of Lippman et al.’s (1991) and Mills and Smith’s (1996) analyses, the
combined effect of immobility and uncertainty may always support an equilibrium
structure with efficiency differentials. Note that without some level of immobility
there is no support for efficiency differentials in equilibrium.  Moreover, Lippman
et al.’s (1991) analyses shows that uncertainty is a precondition for the existence of
resource heterogeneity. In other words, uncertainty is a condition that, in
combination with immobility, is necessary for the support of the heterogeneity
which is responsible for efficiency differentials in equilibrium.  We next turn to
consider models that allow not only for efficiency differentials but also for non-zero
profits.
Models of Efficiency Differentials and Non-Zero Profits
                                                                                                                                            
Rumelt’s (1982) suggestion that immobility and uncertainty are deeply interdependent.
The purpose of this examination of models where efficiency differentials and
non-zero-profits go hand in hand is to provide further support of the claim that
immobility and uncertainty are necessary conditions for the expression of SCA
while heterogeneity is best viewed as an additional condition.
Lucas (1978) and Oi (1983) argue that efficiency differentials will emerge in
equilibrium when inputs are distributed and (quasi)fixed; specifically there is an
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inelastic supply of managerial talent. In this case, profits are returns to (quasi-)fixed
factors such as coordinating and monitoring ability.  That is, a dispersion of
entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms, even if
all firms face the same production function and supply the same homogeneous
good. The key to this result is that firm size is bounded by managerial ability,
which again is limited by the (assumption of) fixed supply of calendar time.  In Oi’s
(1983) models, more able entrepreneurs have the capacity to convert calendar time
into relatively larger supplies of managerial coordination effort but, by assumption,
incur the same loss to monitor work performance as their less able peers.  Thus, in
equilibrium, efficiency differentials and non-zero profits are caused by the
combined effect of factor immobility and heterogeneity, that is, variation in the
input distribution of managerial abilities.  Note, however, that the variation in
managerial ability would involve uncertainty had Oi (1983) not explicitly assumed
away the problem of allocation of entrepreneurial ability across firms and
industries.
Consider further Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982) analysis of a two-stage model
of uncertain imitability. In this model, firms are price-takers, risk neutral and
choose according to expected values.  The analysis further assumes fixed industry
demand, stable technology and homogenous products. Uncertain imitability is
modeled as a parameter of the firm’s cost function, which depends on a realization
of a probability distribution.  Each prospective entrant knows the distribution, but
can only discover its actual cost function by making a nonrecoverable entry fee.
In the atomistic case, the simplest and perhaps most noteworthy analysis
provided by Lippman and Rumelt (1982), entry is sequential; each potential entrant
observes the results realized by previous entrants and receives an independent
draw from the distribution of cost functions.  Given a limit where the realization of
the random component of the cost function exceeds price, there are non-zero profits
in equilibrium. Moreover, due to the random component in the cost function,
efficiency differentials will remain. The prospective entrant expects zero profits but
some are unfortunate and draws a bad cost function. The unsuccessful prospects
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die and the survivors share the rents. That is, positive profits are survivor rents, i.e.,
let all entrants be successful, and profits will be driven down to zero.   It is further
noteworthy that Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982) analyses demonstrate that even in
the absence of information asymmetries among competitors, uncertainty (in
obtaining efficiency) in combination with immobility is enough to produce
efficiency differentials.
Again we see that the combined effect of immobility and uncertainty produces
efficiency differentials in equilibrium.   Since the existence of input heterogeneity is
an expression of immobility and uncertainty (cf. Lippman et al. 1991) and the
obverse is clearly not true, the reviewed studies suggest that there are only two
necessary conditions for SCA (in the sense of efficiency differentials in
equilibrium).16  Note that the reviewed studies explicitly deal with those cases that
are traditionally considered illuminating by RBV writers, that is, where
intraindustry differences in efficiency among firms are supported in equilibrium.
Since most interesting cases in addition to immobility also require uncertainty to
support equilibria with efficiency differentials, and since heterogeneity when not
assumed away is an expression of uncertainty and immobility, we submit that
uncertainty and immobility should be identified as the necessary conditions for the
expression of SCA. Those further assumptions necessary to make the analysis
explicit and which may be included to address a particular problem are referred to
as additional conditions.
The Resource-Based View and the Fundamental Determinants of Sustained
Competitive Advantage
We shall now tie our argument that only two conditions are necessary for the
expression of SCA, namely uncertainty and immobility, to the RBV.  To begin with,
recall the Peteraf (1993) approach to SCA, which identifies heterogeneity,
                                                 
16 One could further argue, as we did in our toy examples, that immobility is sometimes all it takes
to produce non-zero equilibrium profits. So, even in the absence of uncertainty, non zero-profits
and thus efficiency differentials between identical incumbents and competitive industries may exist
in the presence of immobility. While this is certainly true, such a ”result,” simply obtained by
assumption, is not very interesting, an issue we shall have more to say about in the following.
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immobility and barriers to ex post and ex ante competition as four conditions that all
are needed to produce SCA. Our argument is, however, that this is a
misspecification. As we have seen, immobility is a necessary condition for the
expression of heterogeneity, whereas the reverse is not necessarily true (cf.
Lippman et al. 1991).  Similarly, uncertainty is a necessary condition for the
expression of ex ante and ex post barriers to competition (Lippman and Rumelt 1982;
Rumelt 1987) while the reverse does not always hold. This is summarized in Figure
2.
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 2 here XXXXXXXX
Uncertainty and immobility are fundamental in the sense that they are both
necessary for the expression of SCA.  This also implies that, regardless of what
specific (additional) assumptions we make with respect to, for example,
characteristics of inputs (e.g., homogeneity or heterogeneity) and the characteristics
of competition (e.g., Bertrand or Cournot), there are always combinations of
uncertainty and immobility such that we can sustain equilibria with firms that have
differential competitive advantages.  We here comment on immobility and
uncertainty, the two necessary conditions for the expression of SCA.
1st necessary condition: Immobility. As previously noted, immobility simply
refers to sunk cost commitments (Lippman et al. 1991).  Asset specificity and
complementarities are closely connected to this as immobility allows the firm to
engage in signaling, for example, to demonstrate commitment to certain market
positions (Archibald et al. 1986; Ghemawat 1991; Porter 1980).  Immobility is a
necessary condition for, and perhaps the most fundamental determinant of,
competitive advantage.17 To see this, consider a situation with initially
                                                 
17 In the resource-based framework (Peteraf 1993), immobility is likewise seen as a condition for
sustained competitive advantage, but here attention is only focused on the effects of inputs’
bargaining positions, whereas the commitment effects of immobility are neglected.
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heterogeneous inputs. Under full mobility, competition will immediately equalize
all returns across firms.  Adding uncertainty to this does not change anything.
Thus, as suggested in Archibald et al. (1986), Lippman et al. (1991) and a host of
other studies, in the absence of immobility, SCA (as positive profits or efficiency
differentials) is simply not possible.
2nd necessary condition: Uncertainty. Abstracting from the case in which all
inputs are exogenously given, uncertainty is a necessary condition for competitive
advantage.  Uncertainty implies that there is almost surely a difference between the
price of inputs and their realized value, even if the demand side and the supply
sides on factor markets hold similar probability distributions over prices and values
(i.e., they have different point estimates).  Another factor market aspect of
uncertainty relates to “uncertain imitability” (Lippman and Rumelt 1982), where,
for example, imitability may be modeled as a parameter of the firm’s cost function
which depends on a realization of a probability distribution.  Likewise, product
market uncertainty (i.e., demand uncertainty) influences competitive advantage by
introducing deviations in realized productive efficiencies (Lippman et al. 1991).  As
we have noted previously, uncertainty is a necessary determinant of competitive
advantage in most interesting cases, that is, those which encompass intra-industry
equilibrium differences in efficiency.
Apart from the trivial cases where above-normal profits are essentially
assumed, uncertainty may be dispensed with in models that assume input
heterogeneity (as in Oi’s 1983 models).   This is no reason to suggest that
uncertainty and heterogeneity is on par, however.  Thus, according to Lippman et
al. (1991), uncertainty may generally be viewed as a determinant of resource
heterogeneity.  Since the obverse is not true, we define uncertainty as a necessary
condition for SCA but note that it might be suspended with by assumption of, for
example, input heterogeneity and entry barriers in combination with excess
demand.
As previously mentioned, however, we follow Lippman and Rumelt (1982) in
viewing immobility and uncertainty as deeply interdependent, a further reason that
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we suggest both must be viewed as two necessary conditions for the expression of
SCA.  For example, Lippman and Rumelt (1982) note that in the absence of
uncertainty, the creation of a unique (immobile) resource could be repeated and its
uniqueness destroyed.
Additional Conditions
Recall that we defined additional conditions as those causal mechanisms that
add to the explanation without being strictly necessary, i.e., those elements of the
causal chain which serve to shape the two necessary conditions in the expression of
SCA.   This is not to say that such additional conditions are unimportant.  As we
have argued, understanding, for example, the nature of competitive activity in an
industry may be essential for explaining the sustainability of competitive
advantages in that industry.  However, we criticized much RBV reasoning for the
tendency to implicitly entangle the two necessary conditions and the additional
conditions through which SCA is expressed.
Although in principle, the set of additional conditions is unbounded, we
illustrate what we mean by additional conditions by focusing briefly on three
important analytical categories that are particularly pertinent to the understanding
of SCA.  These are (1) the characteristics of competition, (2) information
asymmetries and (3) input characteristics.
The characteristics of competition.  This category refers to such dimensions as
whether competition is Bertrand or Cournot, whether firm strategies are
complements or substitutes, the costs of colluding in an industry, the sequencing of
entry into an industry, the contents of strategies, the nature of trading processes on
factor markets, assumptions regarding preferences etc. ¾ in short, many of those
factors that may be put under the rubric of the “protocol” of any underlying game
within which competitive interactions are embedded (at least in a stylized fashion),
that is to say, the specification of interaction amongst agents.
Information asymmetries.  This category refers to the characteristics of agents’
information sets, that is, what they know about previous and/ or simultaneous
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and/ or future moves of other agents and/ or Nature, and what can be taken to be
private, mutual or common knowledge.
Input characteristics. This category refers to the fundamental distinction
between homogeneous and heterogeneous inputs, whether inputs are assumed to
be given initially or are created, and whether they are of a stand-alone nature or
complementary.
Regardless of what additional conditions are subscribed to, at least with
respect to those contained in the above list(s), any combination of uncertainty and
immobility may sustain an equilibrium where firms experience SCA.
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 3 here XXXXXXXX
Perhaps it should be noted that heterogeneity, in Figure 3, is present under the
heading of input characteristics.  Also recall that we hold the opinion that the set of
additional conditions is unbounded.  Therefore, the list of additional conditions is
not meant to be exhaustive.  As Lippman and Rumelt (1982: p. 420) noted, “it may
never be possible to produce a finite unambiguous list of the factors of production
responsible for the success of ... firms.” With the slight change that we explicitly
suggest immobility and uncertainty as necessary conditions for the expression of
SCA, Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982) unbounded list comprise part of what we refer
to as additional conditions.
There is a further issue, however, regarding the level at which immobility is
effective, that is, at the level of products, firms, product groups or industries.
Often, product-specific capital is modelled as a vehicle of firm-specific capital but
even in a free entry equilibrium when this is not the case, positive profits can be
obtained (cf. Archibald et al. 1986).  So, here we meet a further issue that demands
attention in providing appropriate additional conditions.  Let us briefly illustrate by
considering the possibility of equilibria with non-zero profits in models with free
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entry.
In the case of free entry in which firms sell undifferentiated goods, there exists
a potential for non-zero profits which emerges when the ratio of minimum efficient
scale to market demand raises above some threshold (Archibald et al. 1986; Sutton,
1991).  Also in the case of monopolistic competition, where preferences are defined
over a finite or countably infinite set of goods (Archibald et al.’s 1986 “non-address
models”), equilibria which reveal differential non-zero profits can be contrived by
assuming that one product can only have one producer. Then, if any good is not a
perfectly symmetrical substitute for any other good, positive equilibrium profits are
possible (Spence 1976).  These examples show that product-specific capital is only a
source of positive profits when indivisibility is introduced by some level of
minimum efficient scale with respect to demand (immobility) or, in the
monopolistic case, when some rather arbitrary assumptions to the same effect
(minimum efficient scale) are introduced.  Without essentially assuming the result
by introducing minimum efficient scale (introducing immobility), positive profits
will be dissipated by entrants (see e.g. Archibald et al. 1986; Dixit 1980). In
consequence, strategic behaviour is not an issue here since rents either will be
dissipated by entrants or, by assumption, are impossible to dissipate. As
aforementioned, impossibility by assumption may in effect substitute for
uncertainty in yielding equilibria with positive profits (as in our previously
contrived “toy” examples).18
In free entry models where preferences are defined over the appropriate
continuum of goods (Archibald et al.’s 1986 “address models”), positive profits are
possible in equilibrium when firms behave non-strategically and capital is lumpy
                                                 
18 Further examples of models where free entry may be associated with non-zero profit equilibria
are found in Eaton (1976), Salop (1976), Sheppard et al. (1992) and Sutton (1991). Kaldor (1935)
provides an early example. Note that models in this spirit ususally view the emergence of non-zero
profit equilibria as undesirable.  Moreover, when non-zero equilibria do emerge, the underlying
cause is indivisible fixed costs (due to the integer-problem which may break the symmetry-
assumption necessary to produce non-zero equilibria), plus additional conditions which introduce
heterogeneity. For example, in Sheppard et al. (1992), non-zero profit equilibria emerge due to fixed
spatial locations (immobility) in association with heterogeneity of spatial regions.
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and takes on a specific address, i.e., when immobility refers to the situation where
product specific capital is also firm-specific capital.  Due to firm-level resource
immobility, equilibrium rents emerge when firms behave non-strategically.
However, in contrast to “non-address models,” where rents were dissipated or
unassailable, these rents will induce strategic behaviour with respect to specific
capital.  So, in the case where agents engage in strategic behaviour, it turns out that
the emergence of positive profits hinges on lumpy firm-specific capital (firm-level
immobility) and expectations (uncertainty), e.g. regarding relocation when capital
expires.
Apart from providing further illustration of our identification of immobility
and uncertainty as necessary conditions for the expression of SCA, these examples
show the crucial importance in carefully and explicitly stating the additional
conditions that must accompany any statement about the possibility of SCA.  This
particular illustration concerned the level at which immobility is effective, however,
our point is a general one which, for example, also includes the particular source of
uncertainty, e.g. demand uncertainty, uncertainty associated with acquisition of
production-capital, plant relocation uncertainty, etc.  Irrespective of the particular
source of immobility or uncertainty, the thrust of our argument is that efficiency
differentials and/ or positive profits may exist in equilibrium in a very broad range
of models whenever these twin determinants of SCA are present, a suggestion we
find more or less explicitly conveyed in many previous studies (some of which we
have reviewed), but perhaps most succinctly in Demsetz (1973).
Moreover, models that rely on the combined effect of immobility and
uncertainty goes a long way to explain heterogeneity in equilibrium distributions of
size, concentration and behaviour in empirical data (see e.g. Demsetz 1973; Oi
1983).  Also more recent evidence as, for example, presented in Caves’ (1998)
review refers to causes for heterogeneity in equilibrium that may readily be
reconciled under the twin determinants of immobility (e.g. complementary, lumpy
and discrete assets) and uncertainty (e.g. disturbances that continually affect an
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assets productivity)19.
Conclusion
During the last decade, the RBV has emerged as the dominant approach to strategy
content theory.  An indication of this is the frequency with which the “value-
rareness-inimitability” or “heterogeneity-immobility-ex post and ex ante limits to
competition” litanies are now echoed in the journals and professional gatherings.
As we have indicated, these lists of conditions do not really stand up to scrutiny.
One problem is that these lists lead to logical problems in the identification of
causes of SCA, where necessary and additional conditions are confused.  Moreover,
we have argued that there is a number of derived mistakes, such as what we called
“the uniqueness fallacy,” “the ‘no-rules-for-riches’ nihilism,” etc.  In addition,
empirical research may be harmed (e.g., in the sense of difficulties of replication) by
incorrect identification of the causal chain which explains the expression of SCA
(i.e., confusing mediator, moderator and independent variables).
To escape triviality, models in strategy research and elsewhere, require some
distance between assumptions and conclusions. And managing to create distance
between assumptions and conclusions again requires that one gets causality right.
Otherwise, the door is opened for assuming the result or introducing ad hoc
assumptions to the same effect.   To some extent, the RBV may be accused of
introducing too little distance between assumptions and outcomes.  If, for example,
heterogeneous cost functions are simply assumed from the outset, one is not too
surprised when the analyst concludes that heterogeneity in outcomes will be the
                                                 
19 Caves (1998) further points to the essential issue of relating (im)mobility to its determinants in
basic conditions of demand and technology.  We agree and further add that uncertainty is a
ubiquitous feature associated with market demand and technology.  It should be noted, however,
that Caves (1998) defines mobility in operational terms referring to the standard measure of
mobility where the increment in activity levels (output and employment) between t and t+1 is
divided by activity levels at t.  Whereas this mobility definition may suit the need for collecting
observable data, it also begs support by identification of underlying causes.  In general terms, we
submit that these should be found in immobility (sunk cost commitments) and uncertainty (related
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result.  We believe that beginning with only uncertainty and immobility as
necessary conditions for the expression of SCA introduces more distance between
assumptions and conclusions than what presently obtains in the RBV.  In addition,
beginning with only these two conditions, rather than the larger set of conditions
usually embraced by RBV-writers, has the added benefit of parsimony.   In terms of
modeling practice, the suggestion is to begin with immobility and uncertainty as
exogenous variables and consider the appropriate set of additional conditions as
endogenous variables.
Thus, in sum, our contribution in this paper is to perform an overhaul of the
basic RBV analysis, and in this connection to introduce a distinction between
necessary conditions for the expression of SCA and additional conditions that are
not strictly necessary for the expression of SCA but serve the important purpose of
adding focus, particularity and realism to the analysis.
This results in a simpler and clearer causal structure, avoids the existing
ambiguities in the RBV, and should pave the way for more rigorous theoretical
contributions and applicable empirical research.  Perhaps a first step towards a
sustainable resource-based explanation of SCA.
                                                                                                                                            
to demand or technology).
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